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counting regulatory benefits and 
costs: lessons for the us and europe 
Robert W. Hahn and Robert E. Litan* 
abstract
This paper reviews the US and European experiences with regulatory oversight
and the use of formal tools to analyze regulation. We conclude that the US
and Europe have made some progress in improving regulatory analysis and
oversight, but they can do much more. 
We offer six recommendations for improving the quality and transparency of
regulatory oversight and analysis: three recommendations for the United States
and three for Europe. For the US, we suggest that: 1) The Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB) apply its in-house expertise to evaluate the costs and
benefits of regulations; 2) Congress pass a law requiring that all federal regula-
tory agencies submit annual cost and benefit estimates of major regulations to
OMB; and 3) OMB issue a scorecard assessing the overall quality of regulation
and ask the agencies to complete a scorecard for each major regulation. 
For Europe, we suggest that: 1) The European Union (EU) pass a directive
specifying that the primary objective of regulation is to maximize net benefits;
2) The EU create a strong centralized regulatory oversight unit to help evaluate
regulatory proposals; and 3) The EU, as well as each member state, create a
structure that is balanced, which promotes efficient regulation and discour-
ages inefficient or ineffective regulation. 
introduction 
The United States devotes considerable resources to developing information
on the costs and benefits of regulation, especially at the federal level.1 It is by
no means, however, the only country interested in developing more effective
* Robert Hahn and Robert Litan are the co-founders and directors of the AEI-Brookings Joint Center,
which focuses on regulation and antitrust. The authors would like to thank Lorenzo Allio, Kevin
Browne, Katrine Ring Andreassen, Bruce Ballantine, Scott Farrow, Fabrizio de Francesco, Ed
Humpherson, Scott Jacobs, Lydia Jorgensen, Norman Lee, Patrick Messerlin, John Morrall, Ragnar
Lofstedt, Claudio Radaelli, Frank Vibert, and Jonathan Wiener for helpful suggestions, and Ro Malik
for excellent research assistance. This research was supported by the AEI-Brookings Joint Center and
Groupe d’Economie Mondiale de Sciences Po. The views in this paper are solely those of the authors. 
1 Although costs and benefits should be quantified and monetized to the extent reasonable, qualitative
descriptions of costs and benefits are acceptable when quantifying them is not possible. Quantifiable
net benefits should be used in conjunction with nonquantifiable benefits and costs to reach a decision.
See, e.g., See Kenneth Arrow et al., Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation:
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and efficient regulation. Because regulation can have a dramatic impact on
both consumer welfare and the overall economy, several countries have
developed procedures for assessing its impact. Regulatory oversight and
assessment procedures vary both within countries as well as across countries.2 
In this paper, we provide an overview of some mechanisms used for regulatory
assessment and oversight in the US and in Europe. Our interest is in developing
some general recommendations for improving regulatory oversight in both
the US and Europe. We think that our recommendations will be particularly
useful for the upcoming Lisbon Agenda.3 
Section I of the paper provides an overview of US oversight mechanisms
and assesses a series of government reports on the costs and benefits of federal
regulation. Section II provides a summary of the European experience with
regulatory oversight and regulatory impact analysis. Some recommendations
for reforming the US and European approaches are outlined in Section III.
The final section contains conclusions and recommendations. 
i. us experience with regulatory oversight 
Since 1980, all three branches of American government have shown increased
interest in cost-benefit balancing.4 Our emphasis here is on the actions of the
executive branch, which has had a longstanding interest in cost-benefit
balancing, an interest that cuts across partisan lines. 
In 1971, President Nixon introduced the Quality of Life review process,
which required agencies to consider various regulatory alternatives and costs
when developing significant regulations. President Carter introduced a similar
process with his Regulatory Analysis Review Group, designed to conduct inter-
agency analyses of proposed regulations that were significant. But the decisive
step came under President Reagan, with the formal creation of a mechanism for
OMB review of major regulations. OMB is the executive branch agency created
in 1970 to assist the President in the development and implementation of
budget, program, management and regulatory policies.5 
A Statement of Principles (1986), available at http://aei brookings.org/publications/books/benefit_
cost_analysis.pdf. for appropriate use of cost-benefit analysis in federal regulations. [hereinafter Benefit-
Cost Principles]. 
2 For a discussion of the variations within and across countries, see Robert W. Hahn, Reviving Regula-
tory Reform: A Global Perspective (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 2000). 
3 The European Council will conduct a Mid-Term Review of the Lisbon Agenda in 2005. In Lisbon in 2000,
every EU member state made a commitment to economic reform. One objective was to surpass US job-crea-
tion and productivity within ten years, with a goal of 20 million new jobs by creating strong, flexible, and
open markets. See Lisbon Strategy, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/lisbon_strategy/index_en.html. 
4 This section draws upon Robert Hahn and Cass Sunstein, ‘A New Executive Order for Improving
Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost Benefit Analysis’, 150 U. Penn. L. Rev. (2002) 1489.
[hereinafter A New Executive Order] 
5 For the history, mission and structure of the OMB, see OMB’s website at http://www.white-
house.gov/omb/organization/index.html. 
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The most important innovations in President Reagan’s Executive Order
12,291 were: (1) a set of substantive principles for all agencies to follow, ‘to
the extent permitted by law’, including a commitment to cost-benefit analysis;
(2) a requirement that a regulatory impact analysis, including cost-benefit
analysis, accompany all ‘major’ regulations; and (3) a formal mechanism for
OMB oversight, with a general understanding that OMB had some control
over what agencies would actually do. 
Executive Order 12,291 proved extremely controversial. Nonetheless,
President Reagan expanded on the basic idea four years later with Executive
Order 12,498. That order established a requirement that agencies submit
‘annual regulatory plans’ to OMB for review. The result was an annual pub-
lication, the Regulatory Program of the United States, which contained a dis-
cussion of all proposed actions that might be either costly or controversial.
Executive Order 12,498 served to increase the authority of agency heads over
their staffs, by exposing proposals to top-level review at an early stage. But it
also increased the authority of OMB, by allowing OMB supervision over basic
plans, and by making it hard for agencies to proceed without OMB pre-
clearance. 
Under the first President Bush, the principal innovation was the Council
on Competitiveness, chaired by the Vice President. The Council engaged in
occasional review of agency regulations, operating as a kind of supervisor of
OMB itself. It also set out a number of principles and proposals for regulatory
reform. In essence, however, the Bush Administration followed the basic
approach of its predecessor, with OMB review remaining under the two
Reagan executive orders. 
Cost-benefit balancing had been highly controversial when conducted by
Republican administrations. For this reason, it was uncertain whether President
Clinton would allow it to continue to play a role within the executive branch.
But in a significant step, President Clinton endorsed the essential features of
the Reagan-Bush orders in his Executive Order 12,866.6 The crucial point
about Clinton’s order is that it accepted the basic commitments of the two
Reagan-Bush orders, by requiring agencies to assess both costs and benefits
and to proceed only when the latter justified the former. 
At the same time, President Clinton offered several changes to the Reagan-
Bush processes, mainly attempting to create assurances against the fear of
industry capture of the system of review. First, he attempted to diminish
public concerns about interest-group power over regulation, by providing a
process to resolve conflicts and procedures for greater openness.7 Second, he
included references to ‘equity’ and to qualitative as well as quantitative
factors, evidently so as to ensure that agencies could have more flexibility in
6 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1994). 
7 Id. 
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decision-making.8 Third, President Clinton moved, in a modest but important
way, toward including independent agencies within the executive orders. He
did so by requiring the participation of the independent agencies within the
unified regulatory agenda9 and also by requiring independent agencies to sub-
mit their proposals for inclusion within the annual regulatory plan, allowing the
Vice President an opportunity to advise and consult.10 
President George W. Bush decided to use President Clinton’s executive
order 12,866 for regulatory oversight. The Bush administration has focused
on improving regulatory oversight in a number of ways: First, OMB now
routinely puts information concerning its regulatory analysis and review pro-
cess on its web site, making the regulatory process more transparent; second,
OMB has introduced ‘prompt letters’, designed to encourage agencies to
explore new areas in which regulation might deliver benefits that exceed
costs;11 third, by trying to improve the underlying science and economics that
goes into decisions – OMB issues guidelines to agencies on both information
quality and regulatory analysis.12 
Congress has been slower to support efforts to require the balancing of
benefits and costs of major regulations. In 1982 the Senate unanimously
passed such a law, but it was defeated in the House of Representatives.13 Two
primary environmental statutes that allowed the balancing of benefits and
costs prior to the mid-1990s are the Toxic Substances Control Act14 and the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.15 Recently, Congress
has shown greater interest in emphasizing the balancing of benefits and costs.
Table 1 reviews regulatory reform initiatives, which could help improve
regulation and legislation. 
Table 1 suggests that Congress now shares the concern of the executive
branch that the regulatory system is in need of repair and could benefit from
more economic analysis.16 All reforms highlighted in the table emphasize a
8 Id. 
9 Id., at § (4)(b). 
10 Ibid. at § 4(c). 
11 See Robert Hahn and Cass Sunstein, ‘Regulatory Oversight Takes Exciting New Tack’, AEI-
Brookings Joint Center, 2001. For examples of prompt letters, see OIRA website at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/prompt_letter.html. 
12 See OMB 2003 Report for guidelines for conducting regulatory analysis and OMB (2003b) for
information quality guidelines. 
13 Ibid. 
14 See 15 USC. § 2605(a) (1994) (describing an allowed balancing of ‘risk of injury to health or the
environment’). 
15 See 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1994) (allowing regulation to prevent unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment). 
16 See, e.g., Robert Crandall et al.,  An Agenda for Federal Regulatory Reform (AEI-Brookings Joint
Center for Regulatory Studies, 1997), available at http://aei-brookings.org/admin/pdffiles/
agenda_for_reg_reform.pdf (noting that ‘recent legislative debates masked a broad consensus among
knowledgeable observers on the need for regulatory reform’). 
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trend towards considering the benefits and costs of regulation, although the
effectiveness of the provisions remains unclear. Perhaps because of the
politicized nature of the debate over regulatory reform, these reform efforts
Table 1. Regulatory Reform Initiatives 
Sources: Crandall et al. (1997); Hahn, (2000c). 
Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act of 1995
CBO is required to estimate the costs of laws with new mandates 
in excess of $50 million in any one year on state, local, and tribal 
governments, and in excess of $100 million in any one year on 
the private sector. Likewise, an executive branch agency must 
prepare a cost-benefit analysis of regulations with new mandates 
in excess of $100 million in any one year on state, local, and 
tribal governments or the private sector. The agency is required 
to choose the ‘least costly, most cost-effective, or least burden-
some alternative’, unless the provisions are inconsistent with law 
or the head of an agency can explain why such an alternative was 
not adopted. 
Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement Fairness Act of 
1996 
An agency must submit each final regulation and the supporting 
analyses to Congress and the General Accounting Office. Congress 
has at least sixty calendar days to review major regulations before they 
can become effective. During that time, Congress can enact a joint 
resolution of disapproval that, if passed and then signed by the 
president, would void the regulation. In addition, strengthened 
judicial review provisions hold agencies more accountable for the 
impacts of regulations on small entities. 
Regulatory Accountability 
Provision of 1996, 1997, and 
1998 
In separate appropriations legislation in 1996, 1997, and 1998, 
Congress required the Office of Management and Budget to submit 
an assessment of the annual benefits and costs of all existing federal 
regulatory programs to Congress for 1997, 1998, and 2000, 
respectively. The Office of Management and Budget already must 
review and approve analyses submitted by agencies estimating the 
costs and benefits of major proposed regulations. The annual report 
provisions build on this review process. 
Pipeline Safety and 
Partnership Act of 1995 
The Secretary of Transportation must issue a pipeline standard ‘only 
upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended 
standard justify its costs’. 
Food Quality Protection Act 
of 1996 
This Act eliminates the Delaney Clause for pesticides that set a 
zero-tolerance standard for carcinogens from residues in processed 
foods. In setting standards for raw or processed foods, the EPA will 
now establish a tolerance level to ensure ‘a reasonable certainty of no 
harm’ from pesticide residues. For pesticide products that exceed that 
negligible risk, the EPA may consider the benefits of the pesticide to 
justify granting a tolerance. 
Safe Drinking Water Act 
Amendments of 1996 
Under the original act, the maximum contaminant level (MCL) was 
to be set as close to the maximum contaminant level goal as ‘feasible’. 
Feasible was defined as using the best technology available ‘taking 
costs into consideration.’ Under the new act, the EPA administrator 
‘shall publish a determination as to whether the benefits of the MCL 
justify, or do not justify, the costs’. 
Truth in Regulating Act of 
1999 
Establishes a three-year pilot program under which individual agency 
Regulatory Impact Analyses are subject to independent evaluation by 
GAO, upon request by Congress. 
Biennial Review Provision of 
the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996. 
Requires Federal Communications Commission: (1) to review 
biennially its regulations pertaining to telecommunications service 
providers and broadcast ownership; and (2) to determine whether 
economic competition has made those regulations no longer necessary 
in the public interest. 
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have come about in a piecemeal fashion, and there is some overlap in the
requirements for analysis.17 
ii. the grand experiment in regulatory reporting 
In 1995, Congress passed a law aimed at having the government assess the
economic impact of federal regulation.18 The substantive requirement
imposed by this law could have important implications for gaining insight
into the workings of the federal regulatory process as well as the impact of
federal regulation.19 For the first time in history, a government agency was
asked to produce a report tallying the overall costs and benefits of reg-
ulations issued by several different federal agencies. The US Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), which has primary responsibility for reg-
ulatory oversight, was asked to produce the report. The report addresses
several key issues, including the costs and benefits of federal regulation, the
impact of federal regulation on local governments, and ways to improve
federal regulation. 
This legal innovation was important because regulation plays an increas-
ingly important role in the US economy and the world economy.20 Exactly
how large a role regulation plays in the US and world economies is difficult
to say, but many scholars believe it has a substantial impact.21 For example,
expenditures on federal health, safety and environmental regulation
are estimated to be on the order of $200 billion annually or about 2% of
17 There has been some recent interest in Congress in reducing this overlap by establishing a single
congressional agency that would have the responsibility for assessing the government regulation.
This agency would be similar to the Congressional Budget Office, but it would have responsibility for
regulation. In principle, such an agency could help stimulate better analysis and review of agency reg-
ulations by providing an additional source of information. See Robert W. Hahn and Robert E. Litan,
‘Joint Testimony before the Committee on Governmental Affairs,’ U.S. Senate, ‘The Regulatory
Right-to-Know Act and the Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis Act,’ (April 1999) at http://
www.aei-brookings.org/publications/testimony/testimony_99_01.pdf. 
18 This section draws on Robert Hahn and Mary Beth Muething, ‘The Grand Experiment in Regula-
tory Reporting’, 55(3) Admin. L. Rev. (2003), at 608–42. 
19 Treasury, Postal Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 1997 (P.L. 104–208). See
section 645 (a). 
20 However, a significant shortcoming of the Congressional mandate that requires OMB to report on
the costs and benefits of federal regulation is that it does not apply to independent agencies. In its
2002 report, OMB notes that it ‘does not review regulations of the independent agencies or any reg-
ulations that are not determined to be “significant” under the E.O. 12866 definition.’ See also Stim-
ulating Smarter Regulation: 2002 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations and Unfunded
Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, Office of Management and Budget (2002) at 38, avail-
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2002_report_to_congress.pdf [hereinafter OMB
2002 Report]. 
21 See, e.g., Thomas D. Hopkins, Profiles of Regulatory Costs, U.S. Small Business Administration,
Washington, Nov. 1995, available at http://www.sba.gov/ADVO/research/. 
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GDP.22 In its 2002 report to Congress on the costs and benefits of federal
regulation, OMB notes that the total costs of major regulations issued
between April 1995 and September 2001 are estimated to be between $50
and $53 billion annually.23 The same report estimates that the benefits range
from $48 to $102 billion annually.24 The report, however, does not provide
aggregate best estimates to determine whether the likely sum of benefits of all
regulations during this period exceeds the sum of the costs.25 
Earlier OMB reports suggested that the benefits of regulation could be
substantial. For example, in its 2000 cost-benefit report, OMB cites an Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimate of $96 billion for the benefits of
the Clean Air Act. Two years earlier, EPA had estimated the benefits of the
Clean Air Act to be between $56 billion and $1.5 trillion.26 
Critics of the OMB report felt that the report would be used simply to high-
light the costs of regulation and understate the benefits because benefits are
sometimes harder to quantify than costs. Proponents of the report saw it as a
way of providing greater regulatory transparency and accountability.27 In
particular, supporters of policy analysis and greater regulatory accountability
felt that there was a need to provide more systematic and timely information
on the overall costs and benefits of federal regulation.28 
Before the requirement for a government report on federal regulatory costs
and benefits, little work had been done in this area. The work that was done
22 The draft of OMB’s 2002 report on the costs and benefits of regulation estimated the aggregate cost
of federal health, safety, and environment (social) regulation to be between $181 and $277 billion
(2001 dollars). See Table 11 of Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal
Regulations, 67 Federal Register at 15037 (2002). [hereinafter OMB 2002 Draft Report]. 2001 GDP
was estimated by BEA as $10.2 trillion (2001 dollars). See Bureau of Economic Analysis, National
Accounts Data: Current-dollar and ‘real’ GDP, available at http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn1.htm (last
visited 23 July 2002). 2001 figures (in current dollars) for Medicare spending ($214 billion) and cor-
porate income tax receipts ($192 billion) are from OMB, The Budget for FY 2003, Historical
Tables, Table 8.5, at 132; Table 14.1, at 286, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/
fy2003/pdf/hist.pdf. 
23 See OMB 2002 Report Stimulating Smarter Regulation: 2002 Report to Congress on the Costs and Bene-
fits of Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, Office of Management
and Budget, Table 8 (2002), at 39. 
24 See OMB 2002 Report, above n 23, at 39. 
25 This is a point we discuss later in §3, Evaluation, at 10. 
26 Costs of the Clean Air Act were estimated at $20 billion in EPA’s 1999 report and between $84 and
$140 billion in 1997. See OMB 2000 Report to Congress, at 19–22. For a critique of the particulate
matter benefits, see Randall Lutter and Richard B. Belzer. EPA Pats Itself on the Back, 23 Regulation
3 (2000), at 23. 
27 See Robert W. Hahn and Robert E. Litan, Improving Regulatory Accountability, Washington, DC:
American Enterprise Institute and The Brookings Institution (1997), available at www.aei.brook-
ings. org/publications/books/improving_reg_accountability.pdf. 
28 See Kenneth Arrow et al., Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation: A
Statement of Principles (1986), available at http://aei brookings.org/publications/books/
benefit_cost_analysis.pdf, for appropriate use of cost-benefit analysis in federal regulations. [herein-
after Benefit-Cost Principles]. 
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tended to focus on the impact of the stock of existing regulation, as opposed
to the flow of new regulations that are added each year. Early work by
Weidenbaum and DeFina, and Litan and Nordhaus estimated the costs of
federal regulation.29 Subsequent work by Hahn and Hird estimated the costs
and benefits of federal regulation.30 More recently, Hopkins focused on
estimating the costs of regulation over time, including costs associated with
paperwork.31 Winston provided some useful estimates of the economic
impact of regulation and deregulation in the US32 With one exception – work
by the Center for the Study of American Business under the leadership of
Murray Weidenbaum – none of this research provided annual updates. More-
over, the work by the Center for the Study of American Business was fairly
narrow in scope, focusing on the administrative costs associated with federal
regulatory agencies.33 
In response to regular Congressional mandates, OMB has produced six
reports on the costs and benefits of federal regulation. In this paper, we
summarize these reports using objective measures.34 In an appropriations bill,
Congress requested each of the five annual reports issued by OMB since
1997.35 Each year, Congress has asked for the same core components:
estimates of the costs and benefits of federal regulation; an assessment of the
impact of federal regulation on state and local government; and recommenda-
tions for ways to improve federal regulation.36 The first two laws that directed
29 See Murray L. Weidenbaum and Robert DeFina, The Cost of Federal Regulation of Economic
Activity, Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute (1978). See also Robert E. Litan and
William D. Nordhaus, Reforming Federal Regulation (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983). 
30 See Robert W. Hahn and John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8
Yale J. On Reg. 1 (Winter 1991). 
31 See, for example, Thomas D. Hopkins, ‘Profiles of Regulatory Costs’, Report to U.S. Small Business
Administration (November 1995). 
32 See Robert W. Hahn, Government Analysis of the Benefits and Costs of Regulation, 12 J. Econ. Persp. 4
(1998), at 201–10. For a discussion of the impact of regulation and deregulation outside the US, see,
e.g., Luis Guasch and Robert W. Hahn, ‘The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Implications for
Developing Countries’, 14 The World Bank Research Observer 1 (1999), at 137–58. 
33 Annual estimates of the impacts of federal regulation were provided by the Center for Study of
American Business, but these focused on the administrative costs associated with regulation and the
number of federal personnel in regulatory agencies. See, e.g., Center for Study of American Busi-
ness, at http://csab.wustl.edu/csabarchive.html. 
34 There have been several evaluations of specific reports as well as the process, but no evaluation that
takes a careful look at how the reports have evolved over time. 
35 Although it did not publish a final report in 1998, OMB has fulfilled Congress’ reporting require-
ment for five of the past six years. OMB issued the first report at the end of 1997, the same year that
the report was mandated. OMB issued the second report with Congress’ direction in the Treasury
and General Government Appropriations Act of 1998 (§ 625, P.L. 105–61). The final report was not
published, however, until January of 1999. Subsequent reports were also published one year after the
Congressional acts that asked for them were passed. 
36 OMB is required by law to publish a draft copy of its yearly report on Costs and Benefits of Federal
Regulation, and to solicit comments from the public on its draft report before publishing the final
report. OMB is also required to go through a peer-review process before publishing its final report
each year. 
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the OMB to produce the cost-benefit report specified that the report should
suggest ways to ‘reform or eliminate any Federal regulatory program or
program element that is inefficient, ineffective, or is not a sound use of the
Nation’s resources’.37 Subsequent Congressional mandates were more general
and did not explicitly ask OMB to identify regulatory programs when making
reform suggestions.38 
In scoring the OMB reports, we evaluate OMB’s assessment of the
information in the regulatory impact analyses (RIAs)39 that are performed for
each major federal regulation by the agency that issues that regulation. Much
of the information included in the OMB report comes from different federal
agencies. Therefore, the amount and quality of the information on overall
costs and benefits that OMB is able to report is directly related to the quality
of the analyses submitted by the agencies. 
We examined a number of issues related to costs, benefits, net benefits, and
recommendations by OMB. 
A. Costs and benefits 
In scoring the reports, we have noted whether the report met certain criteria
related to the reporting of costs and benefits (see Table 2).
Executive Order 12,866 requires agencies to assess the costs and benefits of
regulations that are economically significant and defines a ‘significant regula-
tory action’ as a rule ‘that is likely to have an annual effect on the economy of
$100 million or more’. There are several points worth noting: 
• First, a majority of Regulatory Impact Analyses for new regulations
examined in the past five OMB reports quantifies some measure of costs
and benefits. 
• Second, in the past four reports, benefits are monetized less frequently
than costs. 
• Third, a small number of regulations quantify neither costs nor benefits.
In 1997, 5 of 21 regulations fell into this category. In 2002, three regula-
tions failed to quantify costs or benefits, compared to two regulations in
2001. Unfortunately, in 1998 and 1999, OMB’s reports did not indicate
the number of regulations failing to quantify costs and benefits. 
• Fourth, the numbers that OMB does provide cannot be easily compared
across the different yearly reports. OMB states that ‘agencies monetized
all the benefit estimates that they were able to quantify in eight cases’ and
that ‘in five cases, agencies provided some of the benefit estimates in
37 See Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 1998, (§ 625, P.L. 105–61). 
38 A regulatory program is broader than a specific regulation and may include several regulations that
have related purposes or are mandated by the same law. An example of a regulatory program is the
Superfund program. 
39 Regulatory impact analysis and regulatory impact assessment are used interchangeably. 
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monetized and quantified form, but did not monetize other, important
components of benefits’. Finally, ‘in three cases, agencies provided quan-
tified but not monetized benefit estimates’. 
• Fifth, the fraction of new regulations reporting monetized estimates for
both some costs and some benefits is below 50% in three of the four
years for which information is provided. 
A valuable part of OMB’s second, third, and fifth yearly reports is a set of
tables in which OMB standardizes yearly costs and benefits by agency. OMB
monetizes the agencies’ quantified estimates when it is able to, and converts
the estimates to a standardized dollar year so that comparisons can be made
across agencies and years. The 2002 report states that in ‘assembling esti-
mates of benefits and costs...OIRA has monetized quantitative estimates
where the agency has not done so’. 
We do not feel the estimates reported by OMB in these tables are either
standardized or comprehensive enough to be used in reliably assessing net
Table 2. Information on Regulations and their Costs and Benefits 
Source: Adapted from Hahn and Muething (2003).
  1997  1998  2000 2001 2002  2003 
Date range of economically 
significant final regulations 




(4/98–3/99) (4/99–3/00) (4/99–9/01) 
(10/92–3/95); 
(10/01–9/02) 
Does OMB take the agency’s 
numbers as given? 
Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
How many new non-transfer
regulations were discussed in
the report: 
21  22  22 12 34  6 
Did the report state how many new social regulations (or ‘non-transfer’) regulations: 
quantified some costs?  No  19 of 22  16 of 22  8 of 12  27 of 34 3 of 6
monetized some costs?  16 of 21  19 of 22  16 of 22  8 of 12  27 of 34 3 of 6 
quantified some benefits?  14 of 21  16 of 22  16 of 22  9 of 12  20 of 34 5 of 6 
monetized some benefits?  8 of 21  13 of 22  12 of 22  7 of 12  19 of 34 5 of 6 
monetized at least some 
costs and some benefits in 
the agency’s analysis? 
No  13 of 22  10 of 22  6 of 12i  12 of 34 3 of 6 
quantified neither costs nor 
benefits? 
5 of 21  No  No  2 of 12  3 of 34 1 of 6 
Are any quantitative cost or 
benefit estimates provided 
for independent agencies’ 
regulations? 
Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Did OMB monetize any 
costs or benefits that the 
agencies’ RIAs did not? 
No Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Did OMB monetize lives 
saved when an agency did 
not? 
No Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Did OMB monetize any 
pollution benefits? 
No  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
jgi030.fm  Page 482  Wednesday, April 20, 2005  5:32 PMCounting Regulatory Benefits and Costs 483
benefits. While OMB does monetize some benefits that the agencies have
only quantified, these tables take agency numbers as given when an agency
has provided a monetized estimate, even though different agencies may use
different assumptions to monetize costs and benefits. OMB notes that ‘to the
extent that agencies have adopted different monetized values for effects – for
example, different values for a statistical life or different discounting methods
– these differences remain embedded in the tables’. Finally, the tables omit
any valuation of benefits that the agencies did not quantify. Any cross-year
or cross-agency comparison that the tables do allow one to make is still
incomplete. 
All of the reports address the issue of information collection costs, such as
those associated with additional paperwork. In the past three reports, OMB
has also provided a table summarizing information collection costs that result
from federal regulation. The table breaks down costs imposed by executive
and independent agencies. These costs are significant in some cases, but they
do not include many critical costs of regulation, such as impacts on a firm’s
production processes and effects on consumers unrelated to paperwork. 
B. Net benefits 
For each year, less than half of the new non-transfer regulations would unam-
biguously pass a cost-benefit test based on quantified estimates of benefits
and costs. At the same time, only a small fraction would unambiguously fail a
cost-benefit test. By inference, most regulations either do not provide enough
information to compare costs and benefits, or there is a large enough range of
uncertainty in the agencies’ estimates to put the regulations in a gray area,
where they neither unambiguously pass nor fail. For example, in OMB’s 2002
report we calculate that net benefits were not obviously positive or negative
for 23 of 34 new regulations. While it may be sensible to use ranges when
estimating costs and benefits to reflect uncertainty, it is difficult to interpret
ranges. First, the agencies rarely provide information about their degree of
confidence that the actual value of benefits or costs falls within the range.
Second, when estimated ranges of costs and benefits produce a net benefit
estimate that ranges from negative to positive, it is unclear whether a regula-
tion is likely to pass or fail a cost-benefit test. 
The number of regulations passing or failing a cost-benefit test could indicate
the effectiveness of the OMB oversight process, although there are clearly
other important factors, since the flow of regulations is not random and is
determined by forces outside of OMB’s control – most notably Congress.
The number of regulations unambiguously passing a cost-benefit test does
not show any obvious pattern for new regulations over the past five reports. 
The reports also consider the issue of aggregate net benefits. Aggregate net
benefits can provide useful information on whether a particular set of regula-
tions or programs are enhancing economic welfare at a particular point in
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time or over a time period. However, as several authors and OMB have
pointed out, there can be problems with adding up the benefits and costs of
regulation across different studies because of differences in assumptions and
baselines. The 2002 report was the first not to include any information on
aggregate net benefits of new regulations. 
In the past two years, OMB has discontinued the practice of forecasting
aggregate net benefits over time. OMB’s 1998 and 2000 reports included
tables that forecasted the costs and benefits of federal regulations in the years
2005, 2010, and 2015. In both its 1998 and 2000 reports, OMB forecasted
and summed future costs for individual regulations in a summary table. 
Sometimes, aggregate benefits can be disaggregated to provide more
informative estimates. For example, it may not make sense to combine the net
benefits of airline deregulation with the net benefits of safety regulation, but it
might be reasonable to determine whether EPA’s Superfund program’s
benefits are likely to exceed its costs. Generally, OMB has not provided much
useful information on the benefits and costs of specific programs. In the 2002
report, however, it did begin to provide some data on benefits and costs by
agency, information that could be useful for comparing net benefits of regula-
tions across agencies. 
C. OMB’s recommendations for reforms 
One of the initial aims of Congress was to have OMB suggest ways to ‘reform
or eliminate any Federal regulatory program or program element that is ineffi-
cient, ineffective, or is not a sound use of the Nation’s resources’. OMB has
generally been slow to suggest specific reforms. So far, it has not identified
any regulatory programs for elimination or improvement. In the 2001 report,
however, OMB endorsed specific suggestions from the public about reform-
ing, and in some cases eliminating, individual regulations. In 2002, OMB’s
report included information on the status of efforts to improve the regulations
that were identified as high priority reform opportunities in the 2001 report.
OMB has taken further measures to improve federal regulation by encourag-
ing agencies to examine the impact of new, economically significant regula-
tions. The 2002 report states that ‘in response to our request for regulatory
reform proposals, we received suggestions on 316 unique regulations and
guidance documents covering 26 Federal agencies’, and that OMB has made
the decision to change the way it evaluated reform suggestions from an OMB-
initiated process to an agency-initiated process. In September of 2001, OMB
introduced the ‘prompt letter’, which encourages agencies to issue specific
regulations whose benefits exceed costs. 
D. Overall picture 
The picture that emerges from these reports is intriguing. OMB is focusing
less on aggregate estimates of the impacts of regulatory activity and more on
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improving the process and particular regulations. OMB has not used its own
in-house expertise to render judgments on the quality of regulatory analysis
given to it by the agencies. 
OMB is, however, taking greater advantage of suggestions from interested
parties to identify regulations that are in need of reform or elimination. It is
also actively searching to help identify new regulations whose net benefits are
likely to be substantial, and using prompt letters to alert agencies to new
regulatory opportunities. Finally, changes in OMB’s use of the return letter
suggest that OMB may be assessing and making changes to its oversight role.
OMB’s use of the return letter is authorized in Executive Order 12,866,
which states that when OMB denies approval of a regulation that an agency
has submitted, it must also send a letter explaining why the regulation was not
approved. OMB may send a return letter to explain a problem it has with a
draft rule or with a draft analysis of the rule’s impact. OMB issued a higher
number of return letters in the year preceding its most recent report than it
had since 1984 and also instituted the practice of making return letters
publicly available on its website. 
OMB is also making attempts to improve the quality of regulatory analysis
and to make the regulatory process more transparent. In its 2000 Report,
OMB published guidance to agencies on how to conduct Regulatory Impact
Analyses. OMB announced in its 2002 draft report that it was soliciting
comments on what should be considered in updating the guidance that was
published in the 2000 report. This year’s final report lists 5 topics that OMB
intends to consider in developing updated guidance to agencies. 
Since the most recent report to Congress, OMB has involved all of the
executive agencies in significant actions to improve the quality of information
disseminated by Federal agencies. A 2001 Appropriations Bill directed OMB
to issue government-wide guidelines that would improve the quality, objectiv-
ity, utility and integrity of Federal agencies’ information. OMB issued final
information quality guidelines to all agencies in September 2001. In these
guidelines, OMB directed all agencies to issue their own agency-specific
guidelines that described how the agency would: comply with OMB’s
information quality standards; ensure the correction of information that did
not comply with the guidelines; and report to the OMB director on com-
plaints received about information quality. In an October 4, 2002 memo, the
OIRA administrator reported that OMB had completed a review of the differ-
ent agency-specific guidelines, and that ‘[OMB’s] implementation of the
Information Quality Law represents the first time that the Executive Branch
has developed a government-wide set of information quality guidelines,
including agency-specific guidelines tailored to each agency’s unique pro-
grams and information’. 
OMB has recognized that the Internet is a valuable way of making regula-
tion transparent. OMB has made more information available to the public by
publishing prompt letters, return letters, memos, and press releases on its
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own website. There is some indication that OMB’s efforts to facilitate public
involvement in the regulatory process are working: OMB received 1,700 com-
ments on 267 regulations and 49 guidance documents in response to its most
recent request for reform suggestions. OMB has also directed agencies to use
the Internet to make more information available to the public: ‘Agencies
should use their websites to keep the public informed about information on a
timely basis. Specifically, each agency or office should establish an informa-
tion quality site on its website’.40 In addition, OMB’s willingness to work with
agencies to make Regulatory Impact Analyses more available on the Internet
is highly commendable. This online collaboration will make the regulatory
process more transparent and hold lawmakers more accountable. 
iii. european experience 
Regulatory impact assessment is necessary to help the EU improve its overall
level of economic, social, and environmental well-being.41 Regulatory impact
assessment can take many forms, including benefit-cost analysis and cost-
effectiveness analysis.42 In order to measure the impact of a regulation, the
impact assessment should contain some basic features, such as quantified
benefits, quantified costs, and alternatives to the regulation. Adequate
oversight institutions should establish criteria for a high quality impact assess-
ment, ensure that impact assessments meet those criteria, return regulations
when they the benefits do not outweigh the costs, and promote regulations
that are likely to have benefits that exceed costs. Although the quality of
assessment and oversight is higher in some European member states than
40 See Memorandum for the President’s Management Council, Information Quality Guidelines – Principles
and Model Language, Office of Management and Budget (2002). 
41 For guidelines on impact assessment in the European Union and the importance of considering eco-
nomic, social, and environmental impacts, see the EU’s Communication in Impact Assessment
(COM(2002)276 final). See, e.g., Frank Vibert, The EU’s New System of Regulatory Impact Assessment
– A Scorecard, European Policy Forum (2004) provides some reasons for impact assessment. See also
Bruce Ballantine, Regulatory Impact Analysis: Improving the Quality EU Regulatory Activity (The Euro-
pean Policy Centre, September, 2001), [hereinafter Improving the Quality], statement by Stanley
Crossick, Chairman of the European Policy Centre: ‘The Council of Ministers has declared that the
European Union should be the most competitive, knowledge-based economy by 2010. It has, in
addition, ambitious public health, social, and environmental objectives. This requires a regulatory
framework that, at one and the same time, supports the long-term competitiveness of European busi-
ness, while facilitating the development of the European social model. Regulatory impact analysis
can help legislators to achieve these, often-conflicting objectives... ’.  Se e a lso  Sco tt Jaco bs,  ‘ Reg ula -
tory Reform: Time for Action’, The OECD Observer 206 (Jun./Jul. 1997) (arguing for regulatory
reform in OECD countries). 
42 OMB states, ‘The size of net benefits, the absolute difference between total benefits and total costs, is
the key to determining whether one policy is more efficient than another.’ See OMB 2003 Report, at
5516. Benefit-cost analysis says something directly about the economic efficiency of a policy. Cost-
effectiveness analysis typically takes the goal of a policy as given, and provides information that will
help achieve that goal at the lowest social cost. 
jgi030.fm  Page 486  Wednesday, April 20, 2005  5:32 PMCounting Regulatory Benefits and Costs 487
others, the overall quality throughout Europe is generally poor.43 In this section,
we describe the state of impact assessment and oversight in Europe and
identify specific areas for improvement. 
A. Structure of oversight 
The member states and the EU have adopted different oversight mechanisms
for quality control and monitoring of the regulatory impact assessment
process. One possible reason is that the different member states and their
respective Directorates Generals do not share a single regulatory culture with
each other or with the European Commission.44 Some states, such as the UK,
Denmark, and Belgium, have centralized oversight. A central unit directs the
actions of agencies or line ministries, works to prevent the implementation of
inefficient regulations, and provides guidance to agencies on regulatory
impact assessment.45 Others, such as Germany, Norway, Sweden, and the
Netherlands have fragmented oversight in which a coordinating unit fosters
communication among relatively autonomous agencies and is typically con-
cerned with the effects of regulation on business.46 These oversight institu-
tions, particularly the central units, are well situated to evaluate the quality of
impact assessment. Therefore, the type of oversight mechanism can influence
the technical quality of the RIA. Many European countries that lack a central
unit responsible for quality control and monitoring perform inadequate
43 However, it is important to keep in mind that the uses of regulatory impact assessment (RIA) in
Europe differ from those in the US. For discussion of how RIAs are used in the US and Europe, see
Claudio Radaelli, ‘Getting to Grips with the Notion of Quality in the Diffusion of Regulatory Impact
Assessment in Europe’, Paper prepared for conference on Regulatory Impact Assessment: Strengthening
Regulation Policy and Practice. (November, 2003), at 12–13. [hereinafter Getting to Grips]: (In the US,
‘the dominant criterion is efficiency and the main logic is technical. Negotiation and standard operat-
ing procedures are not absent, but they are not overwhelming. ..In most EU countries, RIA is a
communication tool between government and citizens. The “regulator” performing RIA is not an
independent agency, but a Minister reporting to the cabinet. Surprisingly enough, most independent
reg ula tor s in Eu rope  have  n ot ev en bee n requ es te d to perfo rm i mpact  as se ss men t....No t onl y d oes
the logic of negotiation dominate the behaviour of Ministers engaged in impact assessment, it also
characterizes the interactions between public administration and pressure groups, and between civil
servants and politicians.. ..This is why in some countries RIA does not produce a final set of figures
showing if the benefits justify the costs of proposed regulation, but rather a set of partial estimates
that are then used by policy-makers in a “mode” that is more “negotiation” than “technical analysis
of options”. Add to this that in all EU continental countries and the UK RIA has become a commu-
nication tool.’) 
44 However, the directorates-generals of the various member states can help facilitate a harmonized reg-
ulatory culture. This harmonization can begin in areas where the European Commission has direct
regulatory powers, such as competition, telecommunications, and energy. 
45 A central unit is typically located in the office of the head of government. See International Study:
Efforts to Reduce Administrative Burdens and Improve Business Regulation, Danish Commerce and
Companies Agency (2003), at 71. [hereinafter International Study] 
46 See International Study (2003) for definitions of the central and coordinating units. (‘The location of
the coordinating unit is typically in the Ministry of Business Affairs/Economic Affairs, and it is more
narrowly concerned with the effects of regulation on business.’) 
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regulatory impact assessments or none at all.47 Table 3 characterizes regula-
tory oversight and assessment for six EU countries, the United States,
Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.
Table 3 shows whether a country has a central or coordinating oversight
unit, performs regulatory impact assessments, and conducts benefit-cost
analyses. None of the six EU countries in the table have central oversight
units. Interestingly, all of the countries with central units do benefit-cost
analyses, while those without central units do not perform benefit-cost
analyses.48 
Oversight has also been fragmented at the EU level.49 One reason is that
the different Directorates-Generals in the European Union do not share a
47 Radaelli warns, however, that if other departments or agencies perceive central units as ‘intrusive’,
efforts to institutionalize RIAs will fail. See Radaelli, Getting to Grips (2003). The Netherlands pro-
vides an example an EU country where a unit independent of the central government assesses regula-
tory burdens on business. This unit, however, does not conduct quantitative RIAs. For more
information on this independent unit, see www.actal.nl. 
48 We are not suggesting that the centralized unit is the reason that these countries do benefit-cost
analysis. 
49 See Claudio Radaelli, ‘The Diffusion of Regulatory Impact Analysis: Best Practice or Lesson
Drawing’, 43 Euro. J. of Polit. Res. (2004), at 725–49. [hereinafter Diffusion of Regulatory Impact
Analysis] See also Ballantine, Improving the Quality (2001). 
Table 3. Oversight in OECD Countries 
Sources: International Study: Efforts to Reduce Administrative Burdens and Improve Business Regu-
lation: Final Report (August 2003), OECD (1997). 
Notes: The four countries that do not have regulatory impact assessments perform some form of ana-
lysis. Austria, Germany, and Sweden have impact check-lists, which qualify as impact assessments
under the OECD’s definition. Netherlands has an expert assessment, which would also qualify as an
impact assessment under the OECD’s definition. Central Units are: Office of Regulatory Review in
Australia; Regulatory Affairs and Orders in Council Secretariat (RAOIC) in Canada; Cabinet Office,
Regulatory Impact Unit (RIU) in UK; and The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the
United States. Examples of Independent Units are the Small Business Administration in the United
States and the Better Regulation Task Force in the UK.




Australia Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Austria No  Yes  No  No 
Canada Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Germany No  Yes  No  No 
Netherlands No  Yes  No  No 
New Zealand No  Yes  Yes  No 
Norway No  Yes  Yes  No 
Sweden No  Yes  No  No 
UK Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
USA Yes No  Yes  Yes 
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single regulatory culture.50 Another is that the EU has lacked a central focal
point for impact assessment, but this has begun to change as overall coordina-
tion of the RIA process improved dramatically since 2002.51 
Benefits are quantified less frequently in the EU and its member states than
in the US at the federal level for at least three reasons. First, unlike the US reg-
ulatory oversight agency, the unit that oversees the regulatory process is usually
a coordination unit that lacks the authority to review regulations and analyses.52
The Ministry of Economic Affairs in the Netherlands, for instance, coordinates
with other agencies to produce impact assessments.53 Second, impact assess-
ments in the EU are frequently used as forms of negotiation, which are subject
to interest group capture, rather than as tools for direct decision-making.54
Third, benefits may often be assumed to exist and not questioned at all. 
There are substantial differences in the requirements for regulatory analysis
across member states. While many states do not have centralized oversight,
they do have some requirements for regulatory analysis.55 Table 4 provides an
overview of regulatory reform efforts in nine EU member states and six non-
EU member states.56
50 Belgium, for example, defines better regulation in terms of reducing administrative burdens of firms,
and therefore situates the ‘central unit’ in the Ministry of Business. See Ballantine, Improving the
Quality, above n 49 (2001). The UK, on the other hand, defines better regulations as those needed
to protect people at work, consumers and the environment while also striking the right balance so
that they do not impose unnecessary burdens on businesses or stifle growth. See United Kingdom
Regulatory Impact Unit, available at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/regulation/role/index.asp. 
51 See Ballantine, Improving the Quality, above n 49 (2001). See also Radaelli, Diffusion of Regulatory
Impact Analysis (2004): ‘There have been several attempts to introduce partial forms of impact
assessment in EU policy process, but only in 2002 did the Commission make the commitment to
introduce a single, integrated form of RIA.’ 
52 The coordination unit often does not have the power to make substantial changes to the analysis. See
Danish International Study, at 49 (‘The relationship between the unit and departments are to some
extent voluntary or traded, and in the case of conflicting interests, the line ministries are free to
choose the solution they prefer. The unit is equal in ranking to other line agencies, and must use ‘soft
tools’ as support, communication, and education to promote its principles.’) See for example Ger-
many’s impact assessments, International Study (2003): (‘In general the business impact assessment
is conducted with the help from interest groups that are most affected by the upcoming law. When
the proposal is accepted as law, the initiating ministry has.. .to see whether side effects have
occurred and if the costs are in proportion to the results.’) 
53 In addition, it has an independent unit, know as ACTAL, which performs independent analyses and
monitors the quality of RIAs. See ACTAL website, available at http://www.actal.nl. ACTAL focuses
on measures of cost-effectiveness and alternatives that can achieve the same goal as a regulation, but
at a lower cost. 
54 The notion that RIAs serve as the primary basis for regulatory decisions in the US is generally not
true. They do inform decision-making, but as in Europe, laws and regulations are frequently
designed in response to interest group pressures. See, for example, Robert Hahn, Politics and Religion
of Clean Air, 13 Regulation 1 (Winter 1990). For a discussion of how the regulatory process works in
Europe, see Radaelli, Getting to Grips (2003). 
55 France and Italy, for example, have laws requiring regulatory impact analysis. These laws, however,
do not seem to be strictly enforced. Most of the other EU countries do not have laws requiring regu-
latory impact analysis. 
56 See Robert W. Hahn, Reviving Regulatory Reform: A Global Perspective (2000), at 23, tbl. 2-2. 
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Except for the UK, none of the EU member states in Table 4 required
benefit-cost analysis. However, some EU member states, such as Finland,
Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden institutionalized
regulatory reviews. 
The UK has been particularly active. The UK has created a centralized
Regulatory Impact Unit that monitors the quality of benefit-cost analyses.57
The RIAs produced by the UK are relatively extensive and quantify costs and
benefits more than most, if not all, of the other EU member states. The audit
evaluation performed by the Regulatory Impact Unit primarily entails scoring
57 The National Audit Office within the Regulatory Impact Unit evaluates and scores many of the regu-
latory impact assessments. See, e.g., Ed Humpherson, Evaluation of Regulatory Impact Assessments
Compendium Report 2003–04, National Audit Office (Mar. 2004). The National Audit Office scores
Table 4. Overview of Regulatory Reform Efforts Around the World 
Source: OECD (1997a). 
Notes: Permanent indicates an agency or unit is involved in regulatory administration. Ad hoc
indicates that a temporary commission or task force exists. Continuous indicates that reviews are insti-
tutionalized on an ongoing basis. One-time indicates singular or occasional review(s).






Initiated Analysis  requirements 
Australia Permanent  Continuous  1985  Benefit-cost  analysis 
Austria None None 1992  Fiscal analysis recommended 
Canada Permanent  One-time 1977;  revised
1986; 1992 
Benefit-cost analysis or cost-effectiveness
analysis; more complex analysis required 
for regulations with present value over 
CAN$50 million.
Finland Ad  hoc  One-time  1970s; 
revised 1990 
General impact analysis 
Germany Ad  hoc  One-time 1984;  revised 
1989 
Not mandatory; benefit-cost analysis 
suggested 
Iceland None  None Proposed 
1985 
General impact/fiscal analysis proposed 
Japan Ad  hoc  One-time 1987;  revised 
1988 
General impact analysis as considered 
necessary by regulators 
Netherlands  Permanent  Continuous 1985  General impact analysis 
New Zealand Permanent  One-time  1996  Fiscal analysis 
Norway Ad  hoc  One-time 1985;  revised 
1995 
Consequence (fiscal) analysis; 
benefit-cost analysis recommended as 
appropriate 
Portugal Ad  hoc One-time  n.a.  Fiscal  analysis 
Sweden Permanent  One-time 1987;  revised 
1994 
Consequence/distributional/fiscal 
analysis; includes benefit-cost analysis 
and cost-effectiveness analysis 









Permanent One-time 1974;  revised 
1977, 1981, 
1993, 1995 
Benefit-cost analysis; more complex 
analysis required for ‘economically 
significant’ regulations 
jgi030.fm  Page 490  Wednesday, April 20, 2005  5:32 PMCounting Regulatory Benefits and Costs 491
RIAs along several dimensions.58 The UK also has an independent group,
called the Better Regulation Task Force, which monitors the quality of RIAs. 
The quality of impact assessment can depend on reporting mechanisms
that increase accountability. One recent study attempts to compare attempts
to assure quality across member states. Table 5, adapted from Radaelli
(2004), provides four measures related to quality control for nine member
states and the EU. 
The measures are central oversight for quality control and monitoring,
annual reports on RIAs, public availability of RIA results, and public debate
on the quality of RIA process. Table 5 shows that compared with the United
States and Canada, which satisfy all four criteria, the EU member states
perform poorly.59 For example, France, Germany, and the EU itself satisfy
only one criterion, and the Netherlands does not meet any.60 In contrast, the
United States and Canada pass on all four criteria. The European Commission
RIAs along several criteria, such as whether an RIA estimated costs or benefits, whether the RIA pro-
cess started early enough, and whether consultation was effective. See Danish International Study for a
discussion of RIA implementation in various EU member states. In the UK, regulatory impact
assessments have been mandatory since 1998 when introducing most new laws. The objective of RIAs
in the UK is to obtain a quality improvement in new laws and to encourage public debate on the new
legislation. The RIA has to be prepared as early in the regulatory process as possible. See Danish
International Study, at 198–99 for a more extensive discussion of RIA implementation in the UK. 
58 The National Audit Office maintains that auditing and evaluation of RIAs are necessary. Even if an
audit evaluation is required, however, there is no guarantee that RIAs will be of high quality, but
such audits can be helpful in pointing out obvious deficiencies in RIAs. See, e.g., Robert Hahn et al.,
Assessing Regulatory Impact with Executive Order 12,866, 23 Harv. J. L & Pub. Pol’y 3 (2000). 
59 The UK and Austria, which pass on three of the four measures, are exceptions. 
60 Although the Netherlands performs poorly on regulatory accountability, the Netherlands is making
progress on regulatory impact assessment. For example, an independent task force, known as
ACTAL, routinely performs cost-effectiveness analyses and examines alternatives to regulation. See
above n 51. 
Table 5. Quality Control of the Regulatory Impact Analysis 
Source: Radaelli (2004). 





RIA results made public
when laws published 
Public debate on the 
quality of the RIA process
Mexico Y  N  NA  N 
Canada Y  Y  Y  Y 
U.S. Y Y  Y  Y 
Austria Y  Y  Y  NA 
UK Y  N  Y  Y 
Denmark N  Y  Y  N 
France Y  N  N  N 
Germany N  N  Y  N 
Netherlands N N  N  N 
EU N  N  N  Y 
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does not publish an annual report that consolidates the costs and benefits of
regulation or evaluates regulatory impact assessments.61 Of the EU member
states, Denmark produces annual reports on the costs of regulation to
business, with no treatment of benefits; France, Germany, and the Nether-
lands do not have annual reports. 
Since the 1980s, there have been many initiatives to improve regulatory
quality at the EU level. A declaration annexed to the Maastricht Treaty
required the European Commission to account for costs and benefits in its
legislative proposals.62 Since 1997 the EU, and its member states, have taken
measures to implement regulatory impact analyses and issue guidelines for
conducting them.63 The Regulatory Policy Guidelines of 1996, issued by the
President of the European Commission, seek to ensure that all legislation pro-
posed by the Commission is subject to assessment.64 In 2002, the European
Commission began to oversee the development of regulatory analyses.65 
In March 2000, the European Council included a ‘Better Regulation’ res-
olution in its Lisbon Conclusions, which stated that better regulation will play
an important role in achieving the EU’s goal of becoming the ‘most competit-
ive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world’.66 And at the end of
2000, the Member States set up a high-level body, the Mandelkern Group, to
identify ways in which regulatory quality of new and existing EU legislation
might be improved.67 The mid-term review of the Lisbon Agenda in 2005 is
likely to raise this issue again. 
The EU has begun to conduct more regulatory impact assessments. In
2003, the European Commission selected 43 proposals for extended RIA
treatment. For 2004, 46 are planned. Approximately 50% (20 total) of
extended RIAs were completed by 2003, the first year. 
61 In 1997, the Commission published a report on business impact assessment, but the report was not
evaluative. See Radaelli, Getting to Grips (2003). 
62 See Declaration 18 of the Maastricht Treaty. 
63 ‘Regulatory impact analysis’ can involve Cost-Benefit Analysis, Cost Effectiveness Analysis, and a
range of other analytical tools. See Regulatory Impact Analysis: Best Practice in OECD Nations, Organ-
ization for Economic Cooperation and Economic Development (1997). 
64 See EU Regulatory Policy Guidelines (1996). 
65 See EC’s guidelines on impact assessment and handbook for how to do an impact assessment. See
‘Impact Assessment in the Commission: Guidelines’ (European Commission 2002) and Handbook
for Impact Assessment in the Commission: How to Do an Impact Assessment (2002). See Commission of
the European Communities for the European Commission’s commitment to introduce a single, inte-
grated form of RIA. 
66 See Lisbon European Council (2000). 
67 For a more detailed description of the evolution of oversight in Europe, see Ballantine, Improving the
Quality (2001). The Mandelkern Group Report established seven core principles to guide regulation:
policy implementation options, impact assessment, consultation, simplification, access to regulation,
structures, and implementation of European regulation of high quality. See Mandelkern Group on
Better Regulation Final Report (November 2001). 
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Several scholars and practitioners have analyzed the quality of regulatory
oversight in Europe. Table 6 provides a scorecard measuring the quality of
the European Commission’s early RIAs.68 
Table 6 indicates that benefits were quantified and monetized in only half the
cases, that costs were monetized and quantified more frequently than benefits,
that all of the RIAs had positive net benefits, that none were rejected, and that
half were redesigned. The fact that half were redesigned suggests, but does not
prove, that RIAs may have had an impact. The fact that all passed a benefit-
cost test suggests that the analyses may have been flawed, or that there is a very
good pre-screening process. Interestingly, a large number of federal regulations
also appear to pass a benefit-cost test in the US recently. One possible explana-
tion, at least in the US, is that many regulations may pass a benefit-cost test;
however, there may be parts of regulations that do not that are packaged with
parts that do. Furthermore, even if a regulation passes a benefit-cost test, there
may still be room for substantially improving the regulation.69 
The picture that emerges from this brief overview is that centralized regula-
tory oversight in the EU is in its infancy.70 The institutional mechanisms are
not yet in place to assure a high level of quality. There is some recognition
that there is a need to move in the direction of improving RIAs. We conclude
68 This table is adapted from Frank Vibert, ‘The EU’s New System of Regulatory Impact Assessment –
A Scorecard’, (European Policy Forum, 2004). 
69 See Robert Hahn and Rohit Malik, Is Regulation Good For You?, 27 Harv. J. L. Pub. Pol’y 3 (2004),
available at http://aei-brookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=757, for a more detailed discus-
sion of this issue. 
70 A few EU member states, such as the UK, have made significant progress in doing regulatory impact
assessments. The UK is a leader in RIA within the EU. 
Table 6. Scorecard: Quantification of First 20 EU RIAs (2003) 
Source: Vibert (2004). 
 Yes No
Costs    
Quantified 14  6 
Monetized 13  7 
Benefits    
Quantified 10  10 
Monetized 9  11 
Estimation Method     
Best Estimate  12  8 
Ranges 10  10 
Upper/Lower Bands  3  17 
Salient Sub Populations 10  10 
Risk/Risk 7  9 
Positive Net Benefits  17  0 
Redesigns 10  10 
Rejections 0  20 
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that Europe has made some progress in improving regulatory analysis and
oversight, but can do much more. 
Because we are interested in offering recommendations for both the US
and the EU, it is instructive to try to characterize the regulatory oversight
problem at a general level. One problem arises in implementing sensible
regulations at the state level. A state needs to decide whether to have a regula-
tory oversight authority, and if so, what its mission and structure should be.
In general, such oversight authorities in the US have met with mixed
success.71 The record at the member state level is mixed as well. In general,
there appears to be less emphasis on attempts to quantify benefits and costs
than there are in the US at the federal level. 
A second problem arises in implementing sensible federal regulations. The fed-
eral government needs to decide whether it wants a regulatory oversight authority
and what its mission should be. As noted earlier, in response to growing concerns
about the economic impact of regulation, the US government decided to develop
a regulatory oversight capability within the Office of Management and Budget. 
Europeans are now confronted with a similar set of issues, but face a differ-
ent political environment. As explained to us, the institutions in the EU at the
member state level are only now beginning to emerge. There is great concern
about sovereignty issues, and there is great concern about designing institu-
tions that are somewhat insulated from interest group pressures. At the same
time, there appears to be concerns about a growing number of regulations
that could emerge from Brussels that the states will be asked to implement. 
In an ideal world, it probably makes sense to have a centralized oversight
unit to assess new regulations and regulatory proposals at the member state
level.72 Arguments can be made based on scale economies. The regulations
frequently have more far-reaching impacts than state regulations, and there
may be gains to having that expertise in one place that could share informa-
tion with individual states. 
Such an oversight agency should, in our opinion, be committed to
promoting economic efficiency,73 and it should be insulated from political
71 See, e.g., Robert Hahn, State and Federal Regulatory Reform: A Comparative Perspective, 29 J. Leg.
Stud. 2 (2000) (describing regulatory oversight at the state level). 
72 See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation, (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 1993) (explaining why a centralized oversight agency or group is important to
insulate regulatory decisions from interest group pressures). 
73 In addition to conducting standard economic efficiency assessments, an oversight agency in the
European Union should also perform environmental and social assessments. See Commission of the
European Communities, Communication from the Commission on Impact Assessment (2002)
(COM(2002)276 final) for guidelines on impact assessment. The Communication states that the
Assessment must provide economic, social, and environmental impacts. Economic impacts include
effects on economic growth and competitiveness. Social impacts include effects on health, safety, and
education, as well as distributional implications. Finally, environmental impacts include climate
change and air, water and soil pollution. See also Jane Holder, Environmental Assessment: The Regula-
tion of Decision Making, (Oxford University Press, 2005).
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pressures.74 Again, in an ideal world, such an agency would build on the
established expertise of existing agencies that do competent regulatory analyses.
We recognize that both the US and the EU fall short of this ideal, but for
different reasons. 
iv. recommendations for reform 
We offer six recommendations for improving the quality and transparency of
regulatory oversight and analysis: three recommendations for the United States
and three for Europe. Our recommendations for the United States involve
improving specific aspects of regulatory oversight, while our recommendations
for Europe involve establishing institutions for oversight. 
A. Recommendations for the United States 
Recommendation 1: OMB should apply its in-house expertise to evaluate and 
standardize the costs and benefits of regulations 
The major advantage that OMB analysts have over academics is that they
are more familiar with the details of particular regulations and regulatory
analyses. Therefore, OMB should evaluate agency estimates of the costs and
benefits of regulations75 and include an assessment of viable alternatives to
those regulations. OMB should indicate agency assumptions it does not
endorse for particular impact analyses and state its preferred assumptions.
For example, OMB may not agree with the range of benefits and costs that
the agency used in a rule analysis, or perhaps the agency did not describe
health–health tradeoffs where it could have.76 OMB should also standardize
agency estimates of costs and benefits.77 Assumptions for the value of a
statistical life, the discount rate, base year and pollution values often differ by
74 It is important to recognize, however, that impact assessment is a tool to improve political decision
making and not a substitute for it. Indeed, regulatory impact assessments can help curb some of the
interest group pressures that result in irrational decisions. See Robert Hahn, In Defense of the Eco-
nomic Analysis of Regulation: A Response to the Critics, (Washington, DC: AEI-Brookings Joint Center
for Regulatory Studies, 2005). 
75 See Informing Regulatory Decisions: Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations, Office
of Management and Budget, Circular A-4, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/
draft_2004_cbreport.pdf. (2004). [hereinafter OMB 2004 Draft Report] Office of Management and
Budget OMB (2004, 6) (‘While we have relied in many instances on agency practices in monetizing
costs and benefits, our citation of, or reliance on, agency data in this report should not be taken as an
OMB endorsement of all the varied methodologies used to derive benefits and cost estimates.’) 
76 For an excellent discussion of health-health tradeoffs, see Cass Sunstein, Risk and Reason, (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2003) 133 (‘The problem arises when the diminution of one health risk
simultaneously increases another health risk.’) 
77 OMB does not currently standardize agency estimates of costs and benefits. See OMB 2004 Draft
Report, at 6 (‘Any comparison or aggregation across regulations should also consider a number of
factors that our presentation does not address. To the extent that agencies have adopted different
methodologies – for example, different monetized values for effects, different baselines in terms of
the regulations and controls already in place, different treatments of uncertainty – these differences
remain embedded in Tables 1–3.’) 
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agency and rule. OMB should attempt to standardize values in order to facilitate
comparison across regulations and agencies.78 Otherwise, we cannot mean-
ingfully compare or aggregate across regulations. 
Recommendation 2: Congress should pass a law requiring that all federal regulatory 
agencies comply with its guidelines and submit annual cost and benefit estimates of 
major regulations and selected antitrust activities to OMB79 
There are three sets of guidelines issued by OMB for the agencies doing the
analyses of the regulations.80 Unless the President decides that a regulation
addresses an emergency, Congress should require that the proposed regula-
tions not move forward if the agencies’ Regulatory Impact Analyses fail to
meet the guidelines. OMB’s guidelines provide a set of principles for improv-
ing regulatory analysis and making the regulatory process more transparent.
They should be required for all economically significant regulations from
both executive and independent agencies. 
Congress should also require that independent agencies estimate benefits
and costs in the same format that executive agencies estimate them and pro-
vide them to OMB.81 Independent agencies, such as the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) recently issued significant regulations that could have benefited from
benefit-cost analyses.82 
78 In some instances, different values may be justified. But standardizing can still be valuable. Agencies
should also do sensitivity analyses, varying the discount rate, VSL, and pollution values. For an argu-
ment suggesting that the value of statistical life should vary across individuals, see, e.g., Cass
Sunstein, ‘Are Poor People Worth Less than Rich People? Disaggregating the Value of Statistical
Lives’, AEI-Brookings Joint Center, available at http://www.aei-brookings.com/publications/
abstract.php?pid=430. 
79 The FTC and DOJ may need more data and observations to conclude whether antitrust enforcement
has been positive or negative in the aggregate. For now, we can analyze whether enforcement of par-
ticular cases was positive or negative. 
80 The guidelines are: OMB Draft Guidelines for the Conduct of Regulatory Analysis and the Format
of Accounting Statements, which will be finalized this fall and will replace the Guidelines to Stand-
ardize Measures of Costs and Benefits and the Format of Accounting Statements; Guidelines for
Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Dissemi-
nated by Federal Agencies, which were republished on 22 February 2002; and M-00-02, Guidance
for Implementing E.O. 13132, ‘Federalism’, which was published on 28 October 1999. See OMB
(2003a), OMB (2002), OMB (1999). 
81 Under Executive Order 12866, OMB can require independent agencies to summarize alternatives
and preliminary estimates of anticipated costs and benefits for economically significant regulations.
See Clinton (1993) for Executive Order 12866, § 4(c), which outlines ‘The Regulatory Plan’: ‘For
purposes of this subsection, the term “agency” or “agencies” shall also include those considered to
be independent regulatory agencies, as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(10). (1) As part of the Unified
Regulatory Agenda, beginning in 1994, each agency shall prepare a Regulatory Plan (Plan).. .The
Plan shall be approved personally by the agency head and shall contain at a minimum: A summary of
each planned significant regulatory action including, to the extent possible, alternatives to be consid-
ered and preliminary estimates of the anticipated costs and benefits.’ 
82 The recent Securities and Exchange Commission decision requiring Proxy Voting Policies and
Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies could have benefited from
a regulatory impact analysis. See, e.g., Randall Kroszner, Comment on U.S. Securities and Exchange
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Finally, Congress should require that the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) provide OMB with annual cost
and benefit estimates of selected antitrust activities where available.83 OMB
should then summarize this data in its regulatory report. By requiring agen-
cies to submit annual cost and benefit estimates to OMB, Congress can help
improve agency discipline in documenting information from antitrust investi-
gations. Congress should give the agencies some leeway in the actions they
analyze – particularly because of the difficulties in doing such analysis.84
Nonetheless, it should suggest that the FTC and DOJ focus on evaluating the
impact of major antitrust decisions, including decisions not to block particular
mergers.85 
Recommendation 3: OMB should issue a scorecard assessing the quality of 
regulations and regulatory analyses in the aggregate and ask the agencies to complete 
a scorecard for each major regulation 
Table 7 provides an example of a regulatory scorecard that addresses a regu-
lation’s overall impacts, costs and benefits, and alternatives.86 Each agency
should complete this type of scorecard for each regulation and submit it to
OMB. 
We encourage OMB to issue scorecards for two reasons. First, a standard-
ized evaluation will help the public to compare regulatory analyses. Second, a
scorecard should give agencies an incentive to conduct higher quality regula-
tory analyses. OMB must hold the agencies more accountable for the quality
of their regulatory analyses. 
For example, this past year, of the fourteen final major regulations adopted,
eight did not have quantified and monetized estimates of both benefits and
costs.87 This is problematic. It is difficult to determine the aggregate net
benefits of regulation if more than half of the rule analyses do not provide
benefits or costs. We propose that OMB request the agencies to score their
own regulatory analyses on a few simple criteria: whether the agency monetized
Commission Proposed Rule on Security Holder Director Nominations, Washington DC: AEI-Brookings
Joint Center (2003) for an analysis of a proposed SEC rule governing the inclusion of nominees of
significant shareholders in company proxy voting materials.
83 We recognize the challenges in doing retrospective economic analyses for non-merger activities.
However, retrospective analyses of mergers are often more easily done. 
84 It can sometimes take years to gather the data to do a good study on the likely impacts of a merger. 
85 Many retrospective analyses address the outcome of agency inaction (i.e. mergers that the agencies
did not block, but might have been close to the enforcement threshold). 
86 This scorecard is reproduced from tbl. 4, Hahn and Sunstein, A New Executive Order, at 1519 (2002). 
87 See Informing Regulatory Decisions: Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regula-
tions, Office of Management and Budget, at 1 (2004) (‘During the past year, 6 ‘major’ final regula-
tions with quantified and monetized benefits and costs were adopted.. .There were an additional 8
final ‘major’ regulations that did not have quantified and monetized estimates of both benefits and
costs.’) 
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or quantified costs and benefits, used the discount rates prescribed by OMB,
and considered alternatives.88 OMB should summarize the results from the
scorecards in its report. 
B. Recommendations for Europe 
Recommendation 1: The European Union should implement a policy specifying that 
the primary objective of regulation is to maximize net benefits89 
One of the key requirements of Executive Order 12,866 is that benefits
justify costs.90 The EU should issue a similar directive. We would prefer
language suggesting that net benefits be maximized to the extent permissible by
law. We recognize that such a statement is not sufficient for improving reg-
ulation, but it is a very good starting point. A harder problem, not addressed
here, is the need to develop a regulatory culture that accepts net benefit
maximization. 
The requirement that net benefits be maximized requires that some kind of
benefit-cost analyses be done, at least for major regulations. Cost-effectiveness
analysis will not be sufficient in most cases, because it does not provide explicit
guidance on the selection of a particular goal or target. Instead it provides an
approach for achieving a given objective at the lowest social cost.91 
While we endorse net benefit maximization as an objective, we hasten to
add that a decision-maker may want to consider other factors in a decision.
For example, if a proposed regulation were to result in major inequities, then
the distributional aspects of a regulation should also be considered.92 In addition,
a decision-maker will want to make sure that quantitative factors do
88 For a discussion of alternatives, see Robert Hahn et al., ‘Assessing Regulatory Impact with Executive
Order 12,866’, Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y (2000), 874–75: ‘Unfortunately, the agencies generally did
not provide a significant analysis of alternatives in RIAs, even when the agencies conducted a quanti-
tative analysis of the preferred option... This incomplete assessment of alternatives makes its diffi-
cult to assess whether the alternatives would actually be superior to an agency’s preferred policy,
even when using an agency’s own assessment.’ See, e.g., Robert Hahn and Patrick Dudley, ‘How
Well Does the Government Do Cost-Benefit Analysis?’ (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
Center, 2004). 
89 We recognize that this recommendation may be difficult to implement due to fears that the sover-
eignty of member states would be violated. 
90 Executive Order 12,866, §1 (b) 6 states that ‘each agency shall assess both the costs and the benefits
of the intended regulation and, recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify, pro-
pose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended reg-
ulation justify its costs.’ Executive Order 12291, §2 (b) states that ‘regulatory action shall not be
undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to
society.’ 
91 See Arrow et al., Benefit-Cost Principles, at 6 (‘Economic analysis can be useful in designing regulatory
strategies that achieve a desired goal at the lowest possible cost.’) 
92 See Arrow et al., Benefit-Cost Principles, at 8 (‘While benefit-cost analysis should focus primarily on
the overall relationship between benefits and costs, a good benefit-cost analysis will identify import-
ant distributional consequences of a policy.. .Usually, it is better to address concerns about local
economic spillover effects of regulation by using tax and transfer policies rather than regulatory policies.’) 
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not crowd out important qualitative factors, and that key uncertainties are
considered.93 
The reason we think maximization of net benefits should be a primary
objective of policy is because it will encourage regulators to focus on policies
that could improve economic welfare. Although this criterion is not perfect
(indeed, no criterion is), it is a good starting point. Furthermore, it could help
regulators avoid passing regulations that are not based on sound science, or
that benefit special interests at the expense of the public.94 
We recognize that implementing this recommendation is a big step for the
EU. There are many who favor some version of the precautionary principle.
In general, we do not endorse the precautionary principle for decision-making
for three reasons. First, there is not a single, widely accepted version of the
principle.95 The EU has not clarified which version to use for regulatory
decision-making. Instead, it has only provided ambiguous guidance, suggest-
ing that the precautionary principle should be considered within a framework
of risk analysis.96 Stewart identifies four different categories of the precautionary
principle, ranging from weak to strong.97 And Sandin counts no fewer than
19 formulations of the precautionary principle.98 
Second, some applications of the principle can lead to undesirable, or even,
perverse results.99 For example, a regulation banning genetically modified
93 See Arrow et al., Benefit-Cost Principles, at 10 (‘Not all impacts of a decision can be quantified or
expressed in dollar terms. Care should be taken to assure that quantitative factors do not dominate
important qualitative factors in decisionmaking.’) See also Arrow et al., Benefit-Cost Principles, at 10:
‘Benefits and costs of proposed policies should be quantified wherever possible. Best estimates
should be presented along with a description of the uncertainties.’ 
94 See, for example, Cass Sunstein, Risk and Reason, at viii (discussing how people often think poorly
about dangers and sometimes fear the wrong things, leading government to make inefficient policy
decisions). 
95 See John Graham and Susan Hsia, ‘Europe’s Precautionary Principle: Promise and Pitfalls’, 5 Jour-
nal of Risk Research (2000) 4, at 380 (‘In short, there is no such thing as the precautionary principle!
In the context of such diverse formulations of the precautionary principle, it is disturbing that the EC
Communication does not offer a definition or embrace or adapt an existing definition.’) 
96 See European Commission, Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, The
Commission of the European Communities (2000), at 13 (‘The Commission considers that mea-
sures applying the precautionary principle belong in the general framework of risk analysis, and in
particular risk management.’) See also Scott Farrow, Using Risk Assessment, Benefit-Cost Analysis, and
Real Options to Implement a Precautionary Principle, 24 Risk Analysis (2004) 3 (suggesting that the
Precautionary Principle is more a concept for risk management than a replicable guide for action.) 
97 See, e.g., discussion by Richard Stewart, Environmental Decision-Making under Uncertainty, 20
Research in Law and Economics (2002) 71, 76. Stewart, for example, distinguishes among four dif-
ferent applications of the precautionary principle. See also Jonathan Wiener, Comparing Precaution in
the United States and Europe, 5(4) Journal of Risk Research (2002), at 317–49. 
98 See Per Sandin, ‘Dimensions of the Precautionary Principle’, 5(5) Human and Ecological Risk
Assessment (1999) at 889–907. See, e.g., John Graham & Susan Hsia, ‘Europe’s Precautionary
Principle: Promise and Pitfalls’, 5(4) Journal of Risk Research (2002), at 379, 380. 
99 See John Graham and Susan Hsia, ‘Europe’s Precautionary Principle: Promise and Pitfalls’, 5(4)
Journal of Risk Research (2002), at 371–90 (arguing that there are some pitfalls in the European
Commission’s approach to applying the precautionary principle.) 
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food might increase malnutrition, resulting in several deaths. The precaution
taken against risks associated with genetically modified foods could cause
even more significant health risks.100 This approach could paralyze decision-
making because it implies taking precautions against both regulating and fail-
ing to regulate. A precautionary approach to analyzing costs and benefits of
climate change could imply a $100 tax per ton of carbon emitted, or paralyze
policymaking due to a desire to take precautions against both the risks of
carbon and the risks of the carbon tax itself.101 
Third, some versions of the precautionary principle often fail to provide a
clear guide for policy analysis. At the most basic level, it is not logically pos-
sible to exercise extra precaution in all endeavors if one has a fixed budget
constraint, so one has to choose where to exercise more or less precaution.
The precautionary principle, in many of its versions, does not provide much
help on this important issue.102 The 1998 Rio definition of the precautionary
principle was a modest formulation that covered only those threats that are
‘serious or irreversible’. The Wingspread version was more aggressive and
covered all ‘threats’ of harm. Neither of these statements provides guidance
on how much to regulate given fixed resources.103 
Although we think the so-called precautionary principle has some clear
defects, we also believe that valuable aspects of versions of the precautionary
principle can be embedded within a utilitarian framework, and thus be used
in a standard benefit-cost analysis. For example, problems characterized by
100 See Cass Sunstein, Risk and Reason, at 104 (‘A failure to allow genetic modification might well result
in many deaths, and a small probability of many more. Hence the precautionary principle seems to
argue both for and against banning genetic modification of food.’) See also John Graham and Susan
Hsia, ‘Europe’s Precautionary Principle: Promise and Pitfalls’, 5(4) Journal of Risk Research
(2002), at 371–90 (providing additional examples of the perverse consequences, or ‘risk tradeoffs’,
of applying the precautionary principle.) See, e.g., Jonathan Wiener, ‘Managing the Iatrogenic Risks
of Risk Management’, 9 Risk: Health, Safety and Environment (1998), at 39–82. 
101 See Robert Hahn, The Economic Analysis of Regulation: A Response to the Critics, 71(3) U. Chic. L.
Rev. 3 (2004), at 1050–51 (arguing against Ackerman and Heinzerling’s ‘holistic’ and precautionary
approaches to regulatory analysis.) See also Sunstein, Risk and Reason, at 103. (‘In real-world con-
troversies, a failure to regulate will run afoul of the precautionary principle because potential risks
are involved. But regulation itself will cause potential risks, and hence run afoul of the precautionary
principle too; and the same is true for every step in between. Hence the precautionary principle,
taken for all that it is worth, is literally paralyzing. It bans every step, including inaction itself.’) 
102 See, e.g., Principle 15 of the 1992 UN Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (‘In
order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious and irreversible damage, lack of
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.’). See also the 1998 Wingspread Declaration, reprinted in Carolyn
Raffensperger and Joel Tickner, Protecting Public Health and the Environment (1999) (‘When an
activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should
be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.’) 
103 They do not, for example, help in setting the standard for particulate matter. See Robert Hahn, The
Economic Analysis of Regulation: A Response to the Critics, 71(3) U. Chic. L. Rev. (2004), at 1050–51
for a discussion of the problems that can arise when one uses a ‘holistic’ approach to regulation. 
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irreversibilities – such as the persistence of certain chemicals in the atmos-
phere that deplete the ozone layer – can be modeled using standard tech-
niques in benefit-cost analysis.104 
While we would expect some groups to oppose our recommendation, there
are forces within the European Union that may make benefit-cost analysis
more palatable. These include the growing regulatory burden that results
from inflexible regulation in labor and product markets and the fiscal disci-
pline that may be imposed by the adoption of the euro. Even if adoption of a
principle of maximizing net benefits were not feasible at this point, it would
still be desirable to do cost-effectiveness analysis.105 If the US experience is
any guide, it appears that cost-effectiveness analysis can be quite helpful in
improving the design of specific regulations. 
Recommendation 2: The EU should create a strong centralized regulatory oversight 
unit to help evaluate significant regulatory proposals. In addition, states that do not 
have such units should consider creating them 
Some scholars in Europe have recommended that the EU establish a central
unit officially responsible for maintaining the quality of RIAs.106 A centralized
oversight unit can help improve the quality of regulatory impact analyses. We
would go further and emphasize that this central unit must be independent of
regulatory agencies that are charged with implementing the regulations, and it
should have some real decision-making authority. In the best of all possible
circumstances, we think this unit should have a status similar to the agencies
it will have to discipline.107 
This unit should play a leadership role in establishing information quality
and economic guidelines for proper regulatory analysis in the EU and
104 See, for example, Kenneth Arrow and Anthony Fisher, ‘Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty,
and Irreversibility’, 88(2) Quart. J. of Econ. (1974), at 312–19 for an early treatment of irreversibil-
ity, and Avinash Dixit and Robert Pindyck, Investment Under Uncertainty (Princeton, 1994) for a
more general discussion. For an insightful analysis of how various concepts associated with the pre-
cautionary principle can be applied within a standard economic framework, see Scott Farrow, Using
Risk Assessment, Benefit-Cost Analysis, and Real Options to Implement a Precautionary Principle, 24 Risk
Analysis 3 (2004). 
105 Unlike benefit-cost analysis, however, cost-effectiveness analysis does not provide a measure of the
value of the activity. Instead it provides an approach for achieving a given objective at the lowest
social cost. See, e.g., Robert Hahn and Robert Litan, A Review of the Office of Management and
Budget’s Draft Guidelines for Conducting Regulatory Analyses, Washington DC: AEI-Brookings Joint
Center (2003) (‘We think that cost-effectiveness analysis is useful, but unduly restrictive, when the
goal of the policy is not prescribed by regulation or legislation.’) See also Frank Vibert, The EU’s
New System of Regulatory Impact Assessment – A Scorecard, European Policy Forum (2004) (arguing
that cost effectiveness could be very helpful in the EU context.) 
106 According to Radaelli, the EU does not have a central body for quality control and monitoring of the
RIA process. See Claudio Radaelli, Diffusion of Regulatory Impact Analysis (2004), tbl. 2, at 734.
This centralized oversight unit need not be a new agency, but can be placed in a body accountable
to the Presidency of the European Commission, such as the General Secretariat. 
107 A unit with recognized authority, such as the US regulatory oversight office, represents an important
first step, and may be adequate for purposes of effective oversight. 
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member states.108 The unit should review all major regulations implemented
at the EU level and have the ability to accept, reject, or improve upon them.
For example, if a regulation has net costs, the central unit should have the
authority to reject the regulation or ask the regulatory agency to revise it.
After reviewing regulations, the central unit should publish its findings and
make them available on the Internet.109 
It is important to keep in mind that this central structure may face polit-
ical resistance from member states because they may have different regula-
tory objectives.110 Therefore, a centralized EU oversight unit should apply
only for regulatory proposals at the EU level, and should not interfere with
regulations passed by member states. The member states should have their
own centralized oversight units that monitor the effectiveness of their
regulations.111 
Different member states, for example, use RIAs for different purposes.
Radaelli suggests that in the United Kingdom, the RIA was used as a solution
to the problem of ‘rolling the state back’, and in Germany, it is an instrument
geared towards the general aim of simplification.112 While the EU should
defer to states on state-based regulation, it could play a similar role to the US
oversight unit in terms of defining guidelines for good economic analysis, risk
assessment, and data quality that the states could choose to use.113 
In addition, we think it would be useful for the central unit to do an annual
report on the benefits and costs of EU regulation that is similar to the OMB
annual report, but targeted to the EU. This report should focus on summarizing
and evaluating recent regulations in the EU. 
108 For useful examples, see U.S. OMB Guidelines for the Conduct of Regulatory Analyses (2002) and
OMB’s Information Quality Guidelines (2002). 
109 RIAs are not currently published on the Internet. Some scholars recommend that the Commission
publish ‘Intermediate’ and ‘Final’ RIAs, along with supporting analyses, key submissions by stake-
holders and Commission responses. See Bruce Ballantine, Improving the Quality (2001). See also
Lorenzo Allio, Bruce Ballantine, and Dirk Hudig, Achieving a New Regulatory Culture in the European
Union: An Action Plan, European Policy Centre (2004). 
110 See Claudio Radaelli, Diffusion of Regulatory Impact Analysis (2004), at 739. (arguing that different
member states use RIAs for different purposes, and therefore, there are several problems that can
arise when policymakers from one nation try to import regulatory oversight lessons from another). 
111 In the US, state regulatory oversight units generally vary in terms of their objectives and their
impact, and not all states have such units. See, e.g., Robert Hahn, ‘State and Federal Regulatory
Reform: A Comparative Analysis’, 29(2) Journal of Legal Studies (2000), at 873–912. 
112 See Claudio Radaelli, Diffusion of Regulatory Impact Analysis, at 739. Radaelli also contrasts the use
of RIA between the Netherlands and Denmark. He suggests that in Denmark, ‘consensus-building’
is preferred to holding the decision-maker accountable to rigorous empirical assessments. Due to
this consensus-building objective, quality control of RIA process tends to be decentralized and only
partial estimates of benefits and costs are provided, making trade-offs and compromise always pos-
sible. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, RIA has been used to ‘break the cosy relationships
between administration, unions, and employers and to bring back into the policy process the wider
perspective of the ordinary citizen, small firms, and other stakeholders.’ 
113 See OMB 2003 Report on guidelines for conducting regulatory analysis and OMB (2003b) for
information quality guidelines. 
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Finally, the unit must be adequately funded in order to provide training to
EU regulators and better information to members of the European Parliament.
If funding is a significant constraint, then the responsibilities of the agency
should be pared back accordingly. We think the most important task the agency
needs to accomplish is to provide a high-quality review for major regulations. 
This model of regulatory oversight assumes that the analysis itself is done
or overseen by the implementing agency. This means that the implementing
agency will need a strong capability in policy analysis, economics, and other
disciplines where appropriate. Ideally, the regulatory analysis done by the
implementing agency should be done by an independent unit within the imple-
menting agency. 
We recognize that the expertise may not reside in such agencies now. There
are several options. One possibility is for the centralized oversight authority to
be given a budget that allows it to commission studies of regulations from
experts. These experts could reside in consulting firms, think tanks, or univer-
sities, for example.114 It would be the job of the regulatory oversight agency to
review these analyses and ensure their quality.115 
An alternative model would be for the centralized unit to do the analysis
itself, and not serve as a reviewer of other analyses. We think that such a
model is worth considering both in the EU and the US. It would require
greater resources for the centralized oversight unit. Moreover, the agency
would no longer serve an oversight role, per se, but rather one of providing
unbiased economic analysis of regulatory proposals. 
There are numerous issues that would need to be addressed in designing
such an agency. These include avoiding capture, political placement, and
design. These issues, by and large, are beyond the scope of this paper. We
simply wish to point out there is a need for an effective federal oversight
mechanism, in our view, if federal regulations are expected to have a significant
impact on the member states’ economies. 
Recommendation 3: The EU, as well as each member state, should create a structure 
that is balanced, which promotes efficient regulation and discourages inefficient or 
ineffective regulation116 
The EU and member states should create centralized structures that are
neither pro-regulatory nor anti-regulatory and that attempt to quantify all
114 In the US, some think tanks, such as the AEI-Brookings Joint Center, do analyses that inform the
regulatory debate. These analyses serve to complement the government’s analysis of its own regula-
tions, and, on occasion, give rise to the consideration of options that the regulators may have missed
or did not analyze well. 
115 Perceptions also matter here. One would not, for example, want to give an analysis of an automobile
industry regulation to the automobile industry. At the same time, one would almost certainly want
to rely on data from the automobile industry in analyzing the proposed regulation. 
116 The purpose of the prompt letter is to suggest an issue that OMB believes is worthy of agency priority.
Rather than being sent in response to the agency’s submission of a draft rule for OIRA review, a ‘prompt’
letter is sent on OMB’s initiative and contains a suggestion for how the agency could improve its
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benefits and costs of relevant regulations. Because some EU states focus
exclusively on costs in their RIAs, they may be seen as anti-regulatory.117
While benefits may be more difficult to quantify in some instances, economi-
cally efficient policies cannot be identified without considering both costs and
benefits. 
The EU’s central oversight structure, as well as those of the member
states, should have transparent procedures for returning or rejecting regula-
tory proposals. The EU has taken some initial steps in this direction. The
Dutch Presidency of the EU, for example, has asked Member States to
indicate a number of policy areas that have proven to be inefficiently
regulated at the state level. The Presidency’s goal is to gather the informa-
tion, filter it, and finally produce a list of regulations for which new impact
assessments and simplification should be a priority. The list should be
submitted to the Council of Ministers and European Commission late in
October.118 
The EU should also specify the reasons a proposed regulation is returned,
and the kinds of analysis that may be needed to either improve the regulation
or provide a sound economic basis for the regulation. When a regulation is
rejected, the reasons should be clearly stated.119 
As noted above, OMB initiated a procedure for encouraging regulations to be
implemented in certain areas through the use of prompt letters. A centralized
regulatory oversight agency in the EU and in each member state should consider
using this mechanism as well. It has the advantage that it shows the oversight
agency is interested in regulations that can improve economic efficiency. 
One final mechanism the oversight agency can use for improving regula-
tions is to solicit suggestions from the public for improving regulation that are
regulations. See OIRA website at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/prompt_letter.html. For
a definition of return letter, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/return_letter.html. (‘Dur-
ing the course of OIRA’s review of a draft regulation, the Administrator may decide to send a letter
to the agency that returns the rule for reconsideration. Such a return may occur if the quality of the
agency’s analyses are inadequate . ..Such a return does not necessarily imply that either OIRA or
OMB is opposed to the draft rule. Rather, the return letter explains why OIRA believes that the
rulemaking would benefit from further consideration by the agency.’)
117 See  International Study (2003). UK conducts CBA and measures both benefits and costs, but
Norway, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark measure only costs not benefits. See also
OECD 1997 table. 
118 See Reducing the Regulatory Burden: The Arrival of Meaningful Regulatory Impact Analyses, European
Policy Forum (July 2004). ‘The Dutch presidency of the European Union offers a further opportun-
ity to campaign for significant progress. Not only does the Dutch government already have a body,
ACTAL, which has an official position in reviewing and limiting administrative burdens but the
government has also set a 25% target for the reduction of the administrative burden on firms. The
Dutch government has indicated that it will organise a high level conference on better regulation in
Rotterdam in September 2004 with particular attention to elements of the Commission’s action
plan on simplifying and improving the regulatory environment.’ 
119 The US specifies the reasons that a regulation was returned in return letters. For examples of return
letters, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/return_letter.html 
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based on sound economics and science. These could include suggestions for
adding, eliminating or reforming regulations. Reporting on recommendations
from interested parties helps avoid some difficult political issues associated
with having the oversight agency make specific recommendations for reform.
We suspect this is why the US regulatory oversight authorities may have
adopted this approach. 
conclusion 
Several countries are showing greater interest in introducing new approaches
that will allow them to improve their assessment of regulatory activity.120 This
paper explores regulatory oversight in the United States and Europe and
provides recommendations for both places. Six US government reports on
the costs and benefits of regulation now have been completed. We offered a
critical evaluation of these reports using an approach that scores the reports
on various dimensions. 
On the positive side, each report provides useful information on the costs
and benefits of regulation and the regulatory process. In addition, the reports
show how the regulatory oversight function in the US has changed in a rela-
tively short period of time. 
On the negative side, there are clear limits to how far an agency like OMB
can go in providing an objective critique of sister agencies. One of the telling
findings of our analysis is that OMB has taken its sister agencies’ analyses of
regulations as the basic point of departure for providing information in all of
its reports, although OMB has also used its annual report as a place to discuss
shortcomings in agencies’ analyses.121 With well-known defects in many of
these analyses, we think the degree to which OMB treats agency numbers as
reliable is problematic. 
The basic problem that an agency like OMB faces in reporting on regula-
tory policy and developing more effective regulatory policy is that it operates
in an intensely political environment. Some of the recent innovations by
OMB, such as prompt letters, represent useful ways of addressing the politics
and the economics of improving regulation. In that regard, we think that
OMB’s move to organize agencies to work on information quality guidelines
was a good one.122 
120 See Regulatory Reform, Documentation, OECD, available at http://www.oecd.org/topic/
0,2686,en_2649_37421_1774889_1_1_1_,37421,00.html (last visited 30 July 2003) (listing the regu-
latory reform documentation from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). 
121 See, e.g., OMB’s discussion of the EPA’s Section 812 Retrospective Report, OMB 2000 Report to
Congress, § II. A. 1 at 20. 
122 See OMB 2002 Report, at 25 (encouraging agencies to commission the National Research Council
of the National Academy of Sciences to assist agencies in the development of information quality
guidelines). 
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A key insight for those interested in political economy is that strategic use
of the administrative process can result in policies that would generally be
viewed as enhancing efficiency and transparency. Our recommendations for
both the European Union and the US are offered in that spirit. We suggest
that the EU embrace a model with strong centralized regulatory oversight.
We also believe that the model should promote transparency and accountabil-
ity and be grounded in economics, and build on some of the successes of the
US model. We are under no illusions that making the changes we recommend
in Europe will be easy. But we think the potential returns to imposing eco-
nomic discipline on the current regulatory process in the EU and member
states could be significant. 
Our recommendations for the United States are essentially to broaden the
scope of regulatory review and do a better job of providing an honest assess-
ment of the quality of regulations. We think the efforts that the US has made
on establishing guidelines are laudable, but only if the guidelines are actually
followed by the agencies. 
Regulatory oversight in a democratic system is likely to continue to be a
challenge for the foreseeable future. Regulation is frequently the domain of
special interests, who have a lot to gain from shaping the outcome. In con-
trast, most consumers and voters do not have an appreciation of this fre-
quently arcane system because it is not in their interest to do so. We believe a
good oversight system should attempt to serve as a voice for consumers and
citizens, and help to mute the voices of special interests where they do not
enhance general economic well-being. 
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